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CASENOTES
Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Provision
Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc. 1 —Since 1941 the Supreme Court has recognized a labor exemption to
the antitrust laws. The Court initially viewed the exemption as grounded in a
congressional policy of redressing a labor-management bargaining Unbalance
by protecting union organizational efforts. Construing the Clayton 2 and
Norris-LaGuardia' Acts to place certain union activity beyond the reach of
the antitrust laws, the Court delineated a statutory labor exemption which
protects unions acting in their self-interest. More recently, the Court. has
noted that. the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining dictates that
unions not lose this protection whenever they sign an agreement with a non-
labor group. Accordingly, the Court has developed a pion-statutory labor
exemption and has fashioned a delicate test for applying it, under which two
national labor policies—that favoring collective bargaining and that seeking to
Further union interests—are balanced against the antitrust laws. The Court.
has indicated that where both labor policies are advanced, a union may claim
the exemption to protect an anticompetitive provision contained in an agree-
ment with a non-labor group. The Court, however, has never extended this
protection to union-employer agreements which further only one labor policy.
In a recent decision, McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 4 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit examined the labor exemption in the context of a
player's antitrust challenge to a professional sports league's reserve system.
The court held that where only the parties arc affected by market restraints
included in a legitimately negotiated collective bargaining agreement, the
labor exemption will shield even an employer-devised restraint sought in the
employers' interest and adamantly opposed by the union.' In effect, the
Sixth Circuit found one labor policy—the promotion of the collective bargain-
ing process—to outweigh the antitrust. laws where no third party is affected.
This line of reasoning is reconcilable with the Supreme Court's approach to
the nonst a tutor), labor exemption, which developed in cases involving
restraints on business competitors. The Supreme Court's test balances labor
interests against threats to economic competition. This approach does not pre-
clude ascribing less weight to the antitrust side of the scale where the an-
ticompetitive provision does not affect third parties, hut only those who have
bargained over it. The Sixth Circuit's decision thus recognizes the validity of
the balancing approach. The appeals court raises an important, albeit subtle,
challenge to the Supreme Court's test, however, by implicitly suggesting in
McCourt that the collective bargaining process ought. to be weighted far more
' McCourt v. California Sports, 1 tic., 600 F.2(1 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
2
 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1976).
a 29 U.S.C. §* 101-115 (1976).
600 F.2(1 1193.
Id. at 1203.
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heavily than the union interest policy on the labor side of the scale. If such a
view were adopted by the Supreme Court, the labor exemption might soon
bear little resemblance to that envisioned by Congress when it enacted the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. It would square well, however, with more
recent congressional pronouncements and changes in the labor-management
bargaining framework.
This note will examine the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust
laws. First, the facts, holding, and reasoning of the McCourt decision will be
summarized briefly. The note then will scrutinize the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on the labor exemption issue. Because the Court has never addressed
the precise question faced by the Sixth Circuit—under what, circumstances, if
any, an employer group may claim the labor exemption to protect an an-
ticompetitive provision devised and sought by the .employers in their own
interest—lower court decisions on this issue will be surveyed. Finally McCourt
will be analyzed in detail, to ascertain whether it marks a radical departure, or
follows naturally from prior case law. It will be submitted that the holding of
McCourt is a logical corollary of the Supreme Court's nonstatutory exemption
test. It will be submitted further that the Supreme Court should respond to
suggestions in the opinion by modifying its nonstatutory exemption balancing
test.
1. MCCOURT V. CALIFORNIA SPORTS, INC.
California Sports, Incorporated ("Los Angeles Kings") and Detroit
Hockey Club, Inc. ("Detroit Red Wings") are member clubs of the National
Hockey League ("NHL" or "League"), a non-profit, incorporated professional
hockey association. The NHL, like other professional sports leagues, utilizes a re-
serve system" to control player movement and thereby to maintain a competi-
tive balance among the member teams.' Prior to 1972 this system was embodied
in clause 17 of the uniform Standard Player's Contract, which had been
drafted by the League and which every player was required to sign as a condi-
"Reserve system" in this note refers to a player restraint mechanism
utilized by a professional spurts league to equalize competitive strength within the
league by controlling player movement. Typically, the mechanism takes the form of a
"reserve" or an "option" clause, included in every player's contract, stipulating that at
the termination of the contract, the club unilaterally may renew the contract for one
additional year (option clause) or for an unlimited number of additional one year terms
(reserve clause). It is contended that the reserve clause perpetually fOrbids a player
from selling his services to another club. Lee. A Survey of Professional Team Sport
Player-Control Mechanisms under Antitrust and Labor Law Principles: Peace at Last
thereinafter cited as Lee], I I VAL. U.L. REV. 373, 381-82 (1977). It has been well ar-
gued that an option clause similarly restricts player mobility, since generally it is
coupled with a compensation provision, whereby a team which acquires a player who
has "played out his option year" must give the player's former club an "equalization
payment." This compensation requirement tends to inhibit team owners from signing
free agents, for fear of losing valuable players, draft rights, or money to the compen-
sated team. See j. WEISTART C. LOWELL, THE LAW or SPORTS § 5.03 at 500-03
(1979).
7 McCourt. v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Stipp. 904, 909 (E.D. Mich.
1978).
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tion of employment.' This clause required a player, upon his contract's expi-
ration, to execute a new agreement with the same team and upon the same
terms and conditions as his old contract, except that salary could be modified
by mutual agreement or by arbitration." Barring a trade, a player was bound
perpetually to the same club, since the ne• contract had to include clause 17's
renewal provision."' In 1972 the NHL was enjoined from enforcing the re-
serve clause. In granting the injunction in Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc.
v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.," the District. Court for the Eastern District. of
Pennsylvania determined that there was a substantial likelihood that. clause 17
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act,' 2
 to the extent. that it gave the NHL
monopoly power over the supply of professional hockey players.'"
The NHL sought to maintain an effective reserve system without. violat-
ing Philadelphia Hockey Club's injunction by amending its by-laws and altering
the uniform Standard Player's Contract." Paragraph 17 of the revised
Standard Contract permitted a player, upon the expiration of his contract., to
sign a "Player's Option Contract," identical to the terminated agreement, but
limited to one season.''' After this option year, a player would become a
"free agent," earning the "right, as provided by Section 9A of the League By-Laws
. to negotiate and contract with any club in the League, or with any other
club."'" Amended by-law section 9A allowed a free agent to sign with any
team, but required any' NHL team acquiring a free agent to compensate the
player's former club fOr its loss.'' This 'equalization payment" could be an
assignment of player contracts, draft choices, or, as a last resort, cash.' 8
 When
the two teams could not agree on compensation, a neutral arbitrator, selected
by the League's Board of Governors, would choose bet ween equalization
proposals submitted by the acquiring team and by' the team to be compen-
sated. The arbitrator would have no power to vary either proposal.•
When the National Hockey League Players' Association ("NHLPA"), as
exclusive bargaining agent for all NHL players,'" refused to agree to a new
reserve clause, the owners, in November 1973, adopted revised paragraph 17
8 Id. at 906; Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
" 400 F. Supp. at 906.
1 " Lee, supra note 6. at 402.
" 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
r2
	Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1976). Section 2
reads: "Every person N‘•io shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...."
'" 351 F. Sapp, at 518.
'' 46(1 F. Stipp. at 906.
35
 NHL Standard Player's Contract (1974), ¶ I 7(c).
'" Id. (emphasis added). Paragraph 18 of the Standard Contract requires the
parties to abide by the League's constitution and by-laws. Id. at	 18.
National Hockey League By-Law Section 9A (Nov. 27, 1973).
IN Id,
1 " Id. See 600 F.2c1 at. 1195.
20
 Brief of Appellant National Hockey League at 12-13. Every NHL player
belongs to the N
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and section 9A unilaterally. 2 ' Negotiations continued, however, with the
League standing firm on the reserve system, while offering concessions on
other matters. 22 Finally, on May 4, 1976, the Players' Association signed a
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("the Agreement”), 2 " recognizing both
paragraph 17 of the Standard Player's Contract (1974 form) and section 9A
of the League's by-laws as "fair and reasonable terms of employment." 24
Dale McCourt was the Detroit Red Wings' first choice in the 1977 NHL
player draft. 25 On October 11, 1977 he executed a Standard Player's Con-
tract (1974 form) under which he was to receive $325,000 for three years 26
plus a $100,000 bonus for signing." Paragraph 11 of the contract, provides
that the Red Wings shall have the right to "sell, assign, exchange and transfer
this contract ..., and that in such an event, McCourt agrees to "faithfully
perform and carry out this contract with the same purpose and effect as if it
had been entered into by the Player and such other Club ...." 28 In para-
graph 18 of the contract, the parties agree to be legally bound by the NHL
by-laws."
Rogatien Vachon, recognized as one of hockey's premier goaltenders, be-
came a free agent in the summer of 1978. 3 " He had played six seasons with
the Los Angeles Kings, including his option year during the 1977-78 season,
but he rejected the Kings' offer of $975,000 to return for another five
years. 3 ' Instead, he signed a five year contract with the Red Wings for
$1,900,000. 32 By signing Vachon, Detroit subjected itself to the compensa-
tion provisions of by-law section 9A. Negotiations over a mutually agreeable
equalization payment failed," and each team submitted a proposal to the
neutral arbitrator. On August 17, 1978 the arbitrator selected Los Angeles'
proposal, which called for the assignment of McCourt's contract to the Kings,
and on August 28 the contract was so assigned."' McCourt brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to have
the assignment of his contract enjoined."'
McCourt's complaint alleged that the NHL, the Los Angeles Kings, the
Detroit Red Wings, and the NHLPA"" unreasonably had restrained trade in
21 600 F.2d at 1200.
22 Id. at 1202.
23 Id. at 1200. The Agreement was retroactive from September 15, 1975. Id..
24 NHL-NHLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (1976) at § 9.03(h).
25 Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 5.
21; 600 F.2d at 1196.
27 Brief of Appellant National Hockey League at 4.
2H 600 F.2d at 1195 11.4.
23 Brief of Appellant National Hockey League at
Id.
31 Brief of Appellant National Hockey League at 7.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 8.
34 Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 5, 6.
35 460 F. Stipp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
36 For the sake of simplicity, defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as the
National Hockey League (NHL), since Los Angeles and Detroit are member clubs of
the League, and since the NHLPA, though technically a defendant, was ambivalent
684	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:680
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act"' by adopting and applying the
reserve system supported by section 9A. The suit prayed for an injunction
under section 10 of the Clayton Act" 10 prevent, enforcement of the by-law
provision which had enabled Los Angeles to acquire McCourt's services from
Detroit.""
The district (Mini. granted the request For a preliminary injunction, con-
cluding that McCourt had established sufficiently that by-law section 9A vio-
lates section 1 of the Sherman Act..."' The court found a substantial likelihood
that the provision "unreasonably restrains professional hockey players from
freely marketing their services and .. deters member clubs from signing free
agents because of the uncertainty created by the required equalization pay-
ment."' The court rejected the NHL's claim that McCourt's challenge was
vitiated by the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws, which af-
fords limited immunity to certain union-employer agreements. It found that
the by-law was not the product of bona fide, arm's length collective bargain-
ing, noting its appearance in the 1976 Agreement in language identical to that
adopted by the League owners three years earlier. 42 Thus, the court con-
cluded that section 9A's "unilateral" inclusion in the Agreement would not
shelter it from antitrust scrutiny. 4"
Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
vacated the injunction.44 In a 2-1 decision, Chief judge Edwards dissenting,
the court HELD: where a professional sports league reserve system is in-
cluded in a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the players and
the league as a result of good faith, arm's length negotiations, and where it
affects only parties to the bargaining relationship, it is entitled to the
nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws. A players' association's
failure to keep the provision out of the agreement does not mean there has
been no bona fide collective bargaining; where the league has agreed to other
benefits in exchange for this provision, its inclusion is a part of, and not apart
from, the collective bargaining process. 45
The majority reasoned that the nonstatutory exemption protects a pro-
fessional sports league's reserve system when three criteria are met: (1) the
restraint on trade must affect primarily the parties to the bargaining relation-
ship; (2) the provision sought to be exempted must concern a mandatory sub-
about the suit's outcome due to its opposition to the owner-devised reserve system.
Counsel for the NHLPA chose to allow the NHL and McCourt to brief and argue the
antitrust and labor exemption issues. Brief for Appellant NFILPA at 3.
37 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 a seq. (1976). Section I
provides, in pertinent. part, "every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce , among the several States ... is
hereby declared to be illegal."
" 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
3" 460 F. Stipp. at 906.
4" Id. at 907.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 910, 911.
43 Id.
44 600 F.2d at 1193, 1203.
45 600 F.2d at 1203.
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ject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement containing the restriction
must he the product. of bona fide length negotiations." The court
summarily determined that section 9A primarily affects the players, who are
parties, through the NHLPA, to the bargaining relationship 47 and that it is a
mandatory bargaining subject, involving "terms and conditions of employ-
ment," within the meaning of section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act." Unlike the district court, 4 " however, the Sixth Circuit did not believe
that the players had no alternative but to accept the owners' version of section
9A. 5 ° The court pointed out that the players had taken full advantage of
legitimate negotiating tactics in an attempt. to modify the League's position.'"'`
It observed that these tactics had induced the League to include significant.
new player benefits in the 1976 Agreement, but that. the League had stood
limn on its position with regard to section 9A. 52 The court explained that
"nothing in the labor law compels either party negotiating over mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining to yield on its initial bargaining position.""
What the district court characterized as a "unilateral imposition" upon the
NHLPA, which constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith,54 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held to be good faith, albeit hard, bargaining." In the court's view, the
League had not failed to negotiate; rather, the Players' Association had failed
to succeed," Thus, having found all three criteria to have been met, the
court vacated the injunction.'
The Sixth Circuit's use of the labor exemption in McCourt seems at odds
with the Supreme Court's initial view of it as a device to protect exclusively
union activity conducted in a union's self-interest. Indeed, McCann( marks the
first time that a court has allowed an employer group to claim the labor
exemption to immunize an alleged restraint on competition initiated and
sought by the employers in their interest. Before analyzing the Sixth Circuit's
opinion further, it is useful to examine the labor exemption's history to ascer-
tain whether McCann is a radical departure from, or a logical extension of
prior decisions on this issue.
46 Id. at 1197-98, citing Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606
(8th Cir. 1976), cen. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
47 600 F.2d at 1198.
48 Id.
4" 460 F. Supp. at 911.
" 600 F.2d at 1203.
51 Id. at 1202. The court noted that the NHLPA had threatened to strike, had
refused to attend certain meetings, and had threatened to bring an antitrust action
against the NHL. Id.
52 Id, at n.12.
53 Id. at 1200.
54 460 F. Supp. at 910, 911.
' 5 600 F.2d at 1203.
57 Id. 111 September 1979, several months after the injunction was vacated,
McCourt was traded from Los Angeles back to Detroit. Boston Globe, Sept. 23, 1979.
at 46.
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I . HUTCHESON TO CONNELL:
THE SUPREME COURT'S
DELINEATION OE THE LABOR EXEMPTION
TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Statutory Exemption
Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Court. has had to reconcile
the congressional policy of promoting business competition with that of pro-
tecting labor's organizational and collective bargaining efforts. The Sherman
Act, enacted in 1890, declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of [interstate] trade or commerce ...." 58
 It has been
argued forcefully that despite this sweeping language, the purpose of the Act
was not to prohibit organized labor actions which are intended to further
union interests but which incidentally interfere with interstate commerce.'"
When first called upon to decide the issue, however, the Court emphasized
that "every" combination in restraint of trade had been declared illegal and
that the Act's legislative history indicated that attempts expressly to exempt
labor organizations from its operation had been unsuccessful." Accordingly,
the Court held, in Loewe v. Lawlor," that the Sherman Act reached a union's
secondary boycott of a manufacturer.
Reacting to this decision, organized labor implored Congress to make its
intention more explicit, 62
 and in 1914 the Clayton Act was passed." Section
6 of the statute declares that "[nlothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations, ...
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from law-
fully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof ..., "" 4
 and section 20 re-
stricts the use of federal injunctions in union-employer disputes involving
" 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
5"
 The Supreme Court observed in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469
(1940), that the Sherman Act "was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and of 'combinations'
of businesses and capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppres-
sion of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency
of which had become a matter of public concern." Id. at 492-93. Justice Goldberg, in
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), cited
Apex Hosiery's language and continued, "the Act was therefore aimed at business com-
binations, not labor unions, and ... a careful reading of the legislative history shows
that the interdiction of 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade
was not intended to apply to labor unions and the activities of labor unions in their
own interests, aimed at promotion of the labor conditions of their members... ." N. at
700-01 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
6° Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908).
"' Id. at 292. Loewe v. Lawlor, the Danbury Hatters case, involved a union,
seeking to organize a hat manufacturer, which allegedly instituted a nationwide boycott
of the manufacturer's hats and of all persons who sold such hats. Id. at 284 n.l.
" Mann, Powers, and Roberts, The Accommodation Between Antitrust and Labor
Law: The Antitrust Labor Exemption, 30 LAB. L.J. 295, 296 (1979); Gerard and Schlally,
The Eighth Circuit Suggests a Labor Exemption from Antitrust Laws for Collectively Bargained
Labor Agreements in Professional Sports, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 565, 597 n.77 (1977).
63 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1976).
64 Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
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terms and conditions of employment." The Supreme Court, however, again
ignored congressional intent to exempt most union activity from antitrust
regulation when, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering," it rejected the argu-
ment that these two sections of the Clayton Act prohibit federal courts from
enjoining secondary boycotts."' The Court wrote that "there is nothing in ...
[section 6] to exempt such an organization or its members from accountability
where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an
actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.""" Section 20's restric-
tion on injunctions, the Court determined, applied only to labor disputes in-
volving the immediate employer-employee relationship." The Court rejected
the lower court's conclusion that the union's secondary boycott. was a lawful
union tactic 70 and concluded that Congress had not meant to "legalize" it
under section 20. 7 ' Thus, the Court did not construe the Clayton Act to
override the Sherman Act in these circumstances, and it. remanded the case to
the district court to issue an injunction against the union's boycott." Sub-
sequent decisions adhered to this limited interpretation of the scope of sec-
tions 6 and 20. 7" Congress, therefore, again was forced to make its intention
more explicit. In 1932 it passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 74 which extended
the allowable scope of union activity beyond the employer-employee relation-
ship 7 `' and further restricted the use of federal injunctions in labor dis-
putes!" Section 2 states that to effectuate the "public policy of the United
States," the Act defines and limits the jurisdiction of federal courts," Section
2's "declaration" of this public policy reveals that Congress was concerned
with redressing a labor-management. imbalance by improving labor's ability to
organize freely and to negotiate terms and conditions of employment. 78
" Id. at § 20.
6" Duplex Priming Press Co, v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (192 1).
67 Id. at 478. The machinists' union in New York instituted a secondary
boycott against the products of a printing press manufacturer who was being struck by
machinists in Michigan. Id. at 462-64. The manufacturer brought suit in lederM court
to enjoin the New York union's boycott, charging an interference with interstate trade.
Id. at 460. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
complaint, concluding that the object of the boycott was lawful, that it was carried out
lawfully, and that section 20 of the Clayton Act forbade it from enjoining such lawful
union actions, 247 F. 192 at 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), and the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed. 252 F. 722, 745 (2d Cir. 1918).
68 245 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added).
6" Id. at 470-71.
7" Id. at 474.
7 ' Id. at +77.
72 Id. at 478-79.
73 Bedford Cut. Stone Co. V. journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n of North
America, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
" 47 Stat. 71) (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
73 Ch. 90.	 13(c), 47 Stat.. 70 (1932).
7" Id. at § 1.
77 Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
78 Id.
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By 1941 Congress' message had become too clear to ignore, and the Su-
preme Court. finally recognized a statutory labor exemption to the antitrust
laws. In United States v. Hutcheson," a union was charged with violating the
antitrust laws when it struck and boycotted an employer who had refused to
submit a labor dipute to arbitration, as allegedly required under a union-
employer agreements° Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion sketched a
brief history of antitrust and labor statutes and cases, and concluded,
"whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to
be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and §20 of the Clayton Act
and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor
conduct."' Justice Frankfurter viewed the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a con-
gressional response to Duplex Printing's "unduly restrictive judicial construc-
tion" of the Clayton Act." 2 He construed the purpose of the Act to he the
protection of "the rights of labor in the same manner that the Congress in-
tended when it enacted the Clayton Act." 83
 Justice Frankfurter explained,
"No long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit. and illicit under §20 are not to he distinguished by any
judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness,
the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union ac-
tivities are the means."" 4 In this light, the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts were viewed by the Court as congressional grants to organized labor of a
broad exemption from the Sherman Act for their unilateral activities."'
312 U.S. 219 (1941).
" 1 Id. at 227, 228.
"' Id, at 231.
" Id. at 236.
" Id. (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 232.
8" Id. at 236. The Court's prior decision in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940), although based on a different line of reasoning, had adumbrated the
Hutcheson result. Apex Hosiery involved a union's violent primary sit-clown strike in an
attempt to conclude a closed-shop agreement_ Id. at 481-82. Even though the union's
action naturally interfered with the flow of manufactured goods into interstate com-
merce, id. at 484, the Court explained that the union's purpose was to promote labo r
interests, rather than to suppress interstate commerce, id. at 5(11, and that the Sher-
man Act was not meant to interdict the "indirect" trade restraints which resulted front
the union's activities. Id. at 510-12. The Court also cited the Norris-LaGuardia and the
National Labor Relations Acts. id. at n.24, in concluding that the elimination of price
competition based upon differences in labor standards is a legitimate objective of any
labor union and that it was not the evil sought to be remedied by the Sherman Act. Id.
at 503-04.
As one commentator has noted, the Apex Hosiery Court was re-interpreting the
scope of the Sherman Act, saying that it would not apply to a certain type of market
restraint; it was not recognizing a statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws based
on the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. See St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law al the
Expeirse of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603, 606-07 (1976).
The statutory labor exemption offers unions more protection from antitrust liabil-
ity than does the Apex Hosiery decision in an important respect. In determining
whether the statutory exemption applies, the inquiry into the union's intent is elimi-
nated. so
 long as the union pursues its goals unilaterally. See Note, Labor's Antitrust
Exemption After Connell, 36 Onto Si'. 852, 857 (1975).
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Four years later the Supreme Court made it clear that this exemption
was for the benefit of labor, not business, groups. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
3, IBEW 86 the Court held that a union forfeits its right to the labor exemp-
tion when it joins an employer conspiracy to monopolize the product market,
even if the restraint of trade inures to the union's benefit. 87 Justice Black
stated for the majority that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts conferred
upon the unions "special exceptions to a general legislative plan" intended to
preserve business competition." He concluded that although the statute
permits a union to further its interests unilaterally," the union can not "aid
and abet" employers who are violating the Sherman Act." 4' He noted that
Congress did not intend to allow businessmen to monopolize product markets
with impunity merely by combining with labor unions in such an endeavor."'
The statutory labor exemption has remained limited to the Hutcheson-
Allen Bradley interpretation of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. The
Supreme Court. construes these Acts to place certain labor interests beyond
the reach of the antitrust laws. Where a union acts unilaterally and in its own
interest, it cannot be held liable under the Sherman Act, even if its action
produces incidental restraints on interstate commerce. The union's interests in
organizing and in eliminating competition based upon differences in labor
standards take precedence over the goal of encouraging business competition
in such a case.
B. The Nonstatutory Exemption
Justice Goldberg observed that it would be irrational to permit labor and
business groups to conduct industrial warfare, but to prohibit them from
reaching a peaceful settlement of their disputes."' Such a paradox could re-
sult if the only labor exemption to the antitrust laws were that embodied in
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts and recognized in Hutcheson. A union
which struck or boycotted an employer to eliminate competition based upon
" 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
87 Id. at 810. The Court found that a combination of local electrical contrac-
tors and manufacturers had conspired to monopolize the supply of electrical equip-
ment in New York City. Id. at 800-01. The record below indicated that the
businessmen had agreed among themselves and with the defendant union that the
contractors would buy only from local manufacturers who had closed shop agreements
with the union, and that the manfacturers would sell locally only to those contractors
employing the union's members. All three groups benefited from the plan, as wages
and equipment prices increased dramatically, and as outside groups were excluded
from competing in the area. Id. at 800.
" Id. at 809.
89 Id. at 807.
9 ° Id. at 810. Here, the union had joined a conspiracy among businessmen to
restrain competition in the product market. Allen Bradley left open the question
whether the union loses its immunity when it seeks to advance its interests through an
agreement with a non-labor group, where there is no evidence of a business conspiracy
to restrain trade. Id. at 809.
"I Id. at 810.
92 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 712
(1965).
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differences in labor standards would be immune from antitrust sanctions, but
if the union sought to advance these same interests by signing an agreement
with a non-labor group, it well might lose this immunity. It no longer would
be acting unilaterally, and Allen Bradley could be read to bar the statutory
exemption.93
The Supreme Court reacted to this potential paradox by creating a non-
statutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Unlike the statutory exemp-
tion, the nonstatutory exemption does not stein from the Court's finding of a
"special exception" to the Sherman Act. 94 Rather, it is grounded in (I) the
Court's recognition that congressional antitrust and labor policies often lead in
opposite directions, and (2) the Court's attempt to reconcile these conflicting
national policies in cases in which a union seeks to advance its interests
through an agreement with an employer group which restrains competition in
the product market. As might be expected, this attempt. to accommodate con-
flicting legislative policies has been difficult and has left open many questions.
In a tangled series of opinions, the Supreme Court has outlined a delicate
balancing test with which courts must struggle to apply the nonstatutory labor
exemption.
The contours of the nonstatutory exemption were defined initially in two
cases decided on the same clay, twenty years after Allen Bradley. United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington 95 and Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 46 involved union-employer agreements which allegedly
furthered labor interests while restraining competition in the product market.
The issue in each case was whether the union was exempt from the antitrust
laws, despite its combination with a non-labor group in agreeing to the an-
ticompetitive provisions." Three groups of Justices wrote separate opinions
"3 The Court, in Allen Bradley, wrote: "Our holding means that the same labor
union activities may or may not he in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon
whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups." 325 U.S. at 810.
This broad language is tempered by the facts of Allen Bradley, in which the union
joined a business conspiracy to restrain product market competititon. The Court's find-
ing that the union violated the Sherman Act does not imply that a union necessarily
forfeits its exemption when it seeks to advance a labor interest in an agreement with
an employer group, where it has not joined an employer conspiracy to control the
market. In fact, the Court assumed that such an agreement "standing alone" (that is,
where it is not part of a business group conspiracy) would not violate the Sherman
Act. Id. at 809. This left the door open for Jewel Tea's application of a nonstatutory
exemption to a fact situation in which the union combined with an employer group by
signing a collective bargaining agreement, but where there was no finding of an
employer group conspiracy to restrain competition. See text at notes 94-138 infra.
" 4 325 U.S. at 809. See also text at note 88 supra.
"5 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
"' 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
" 7 In Pennington, it was alleged that the union had agreed with an employer
group to accept mechanization of the mines in return for higher wages. Under the
alleged agreement the union would force its higher wage demands on all mine owners,
regardless of their ability to pay or their degree of mechanization. It was alleged that
this agreement was intended to drive the smaller operators out of business, thereby
ameliorating the problem of chronic coal overproduction. 381 U.S. at 659-60. In Jewel
Tea, the unions sought to lessen their members' working hours by setting the business
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in each case." In Pennington, six justices agreed that the union was not enti-
tled to an exemption, while in Jewel Tea the Court split 6-3 in allowing the
exemption.
Justice Douglas' group viewed Allen Bradley as controlling in each case. In
Pennington, Justice Douglas viewed the alleged agreement, if proved, as
evidencing a union-employer conspiracy to eliminate weaker competitors, and
he urged disallowance of the exemption." His concurring opinion lauded
the Court's "reaffirmance" of the Allen Bradley principles anti stressed the
labor exemption's unavailability to unions which "join hands" with organized
business to restrain competition in the product market.'" In his Jewel Tea
dissent, justice Douglas discovered, contrary to the finding of six justices,
another union-employer conspiracy to restrict busineSs competition. The un-
ions had induced a group of employers to sign a collective bargaining agree-
ment containing provisions which were beneficial to labor but which restricted
the marketing opportunities of the businessmen's competitors."' Justice
Douglas characterized this as a "conspiracy among the employers with the
unions to impose the marketing-hours restrictions on jewel via a strike threat
by the unions." 112 In Justice Douglas' opinion, even without other proof of a
predatory intent, "the collective bargaining agreement itself ... and the con-
text in which it was written" were evidence enough of such a conspiracy.'"
It did not matter to him that the restrictive provision was initiated by the
unions in their self-interest and was embodied in an agreement on working
conditions; Justice Douglas thought that Allen Bradley prohibited any union-
employer "conspiracy" to control the marketing of goods and services. 104 In
essence, Justice Douglas' group would not allow a broader labor exemption
than the statutory one recognized in Hutcheson.
hours ()I' the markets in which the members were employed. Most of the employer
group agreed to this demand. jewel Tea Co. refused to sign the agreement, however,
and the unions voted to strike Jewel's stores. jewel subsequently signed the agreement
under the strike threat, but it later brought suit to invalidate the agreement as violative
of the Sherman Act, The complaint alleged that the unions had conspired with jewel's
competitors to impose the restriction in an attempt to lessen competition in the meat
retailing industry. Id. at 680-82.
11 " justice White, joined by Chief justice Warren and justice Brennan. wrote
the lead opinion in each case. In Pennington, this group was joined by justices Douglas,
Black, and Clark in an opinion of the Court. The latter three justices also joined in a
concurring opinion under justice Douglas' name. justice Cokibeeg wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which justices Harlan and Stewart joined. In jewel Tea. justice White an-
nounced the judgment of the Court. and his lead opinion again was joined by Chief
justice Warren and justice Brennan. This time, justice Goldberg's group concurred
with the result in a separate opinion, while justice Douglas' group dissented.
"" 381 U.S. at 672-73.
" 1 Id. at 680-81.
"2 Id. at 736.
113 Id. at 737. In Pennington. justice Douglas made a similar assertion, writing
that the existence of an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement, whereby
employers and unions agree on a wage scale that exceeds the financial ability of some
operators to pay, would be prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. 381 U.S. at
672-73.
114 381 U.S. at 737-38.
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Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, voted to allow the exemption in
both cases. In an opinion which served as a dissent in Pennington and as a
concurrence in the result of Jewel Tea, he reviewed the history of major labor
and antitrust legislation.'" He reasoned that labor's exemption "derives
from a synthesis of all pertinent congressional legislation," not just the Sher-
man, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.'" He explained that the Wagner
Act, with its Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments (collectively, the
National Labor Relations Act)'" is an integral part of our national labor pal-
icy,'° 8 which is designed to "encourage the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes" by promoting free collective bargaining.'" Justice Goldberg ob-
served that Congress had implemented this "national scheme" by directing
employers and unions to bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.'" He determined that subjecting the product of
such compulsory bargaining to antitrust scrutiny would he unfair to the
negotiating parties and would stultify the congressional scheme."' He there-
fore advocated exempting any agreement on mandatory bargaining subjects
(as defined by the NLRA) from judicial antitrust regulation. 112 J ustice
Goldberg's inquiry thus was limited to whether the market restrictions were
imposed via a union-employer agreement. concerning wages and working
conditions. Finding that they were in Pennington and Jewel Tea, 13 he would
not have a court "roam at large" by inquiring into the purposes and motives
of the parties to the agreement."a His experience convinced him that this
was the only way to prevent judicial frustration of the congressional judgment
as to how collective bargaining should operate." 5
In the lead opinions to both cases, Justice White's group reached a result
which could be joined by justice Douglas in Pennington and by Justice
Goldberg in Jewel Tea. justice White, like his Brother Goldberg, did not share
justice Douglas' view of the labor exemption as a narrow exception to the
antitrust laws, carved out by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts for the
benefit of unions. He believed that the Court should look beyond Congress'
express immunization of unilateral union activity and delineate a broader
1 "5 Id. at 700-09.
16 Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
" 7 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Slat, 136 (1947), 65 Sun, 601 (1951),
72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 88 Stat. 395 (1974), 29 U.S.G. §§ 151-169 .
(1976).
"" 381 U.S. at 709-11.
'°" Id. at 722.
'Ill Id, at 711.
" I Id. at 711-12.
12 Id. at 710.
"3 Id. at 699-700.
" 4 Id. at 716.
'" Id. Justice Goldberg pointed to Justice Douglas' analysis, which scented to
permit a court or jury to infer a predatory intent on the part of the signatories to a
collective bargaining agreement from the agreement itself, as the epitome of such judicial
intrusion into the congressionally mandated collective bargaining process. Id. at 715,
719-20.
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exemption for certain union-employer agreements)" He reasoned that
exemption for such agreements "is very much a matter of accommodating the
coverage of the Sherman Act. to the policy of the labor laws. >, 117 Like Justice
Goldberg, he emphasized that Congress, in the NLRA, had mandated collec-
tive bargaining on wages, hours, and working conditions in an effort to pro-
mote industrial peace.' Justice White concluded that "this fact weighs heav-
ily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects."'" He
disagreed, however, with Justice Goldberg's conclusion that all agreements on
mandatory bargaining subjects could claim the exemption. Justice White be-
lieved that one should not view the NLRA in isolation, but that both the
Sherman Act and the labor policy of advancing union interests' 2" also should
be considered in the labor-antitrust accommodation."' In Pennington, after
noting the policy behind the NLRA, he added, "Whis is not to say that an
agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is automatically
exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations involve a
compulsory subject of bargaining .... 122 He explained that there are
"limits to what a union or an employer may offer or extract in the name of
wages, and because they must bargain does not mean that the agreement
reached may disregard other laws."'"
Pennington and jewel Tea were the vehicles with which Justice White es-
tablished these limits. In Pennington, he concluded that the exemption does
not apply to protect union-employer agreements—even on wage scales—that
contain a market restriction' 24 which ( I) is sought in furtherance of an
employer group's "scheme" to eliminate weaker competitors," 5 rather than in
pursuance of a purely union interest,"" and (2) "straitjackets" the union in its
negotiations with other employers, thereby interfering with the union's right
"" Pennington, 381 U.S. at 662-65; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 688-91. It was not
until later cases that the term "rionstatuuoy exemption" was used to differentiate the
labor exemption adopted in Jewel Tea from that recognized in Hutcheson. See text at
note 148 infra.
17 381 U.S. at 689.
"8 Id.; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665.
"9 381 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
'" justice White made it clear that, unlike Justice Goldberg, he viewed the
advancement of exclusively union interests as an element of our national labor policy
at least as important as that of promoting collective bargaining to achieve industrial
peace. In Pennington, he gave explicit recognition to the policy of achieving uniformity
in labor standards, id. at 666, and argued that the exemption should apply only where
the agreement is reached "as a matter of ... [the union's] own policy," and "in pur-
suance of its own union interests." Id. at 664, 665. In Jewel Tea, he reasoned that the
agreement must be intimately related to a subject of "immediate and direct" concern to
union members. 381 U.S. at 691.
12 ' Id. at 665-66.
122 Id, at 664-65.
123 Id.
124 In Pennington,• the alleged restrictive provision stipulated that the union
would seek to impose the agreed-upon wage scales on other employers outside of the
bargaining unit, regardless of their ability to pay. Id.
125 Id. at 665-66.
126 Id. at 664-65; see note 120 supra.
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to act freely in its self-interest: 27 jewel Tea, on the other hand, enabled Jus-
tice White to apply his balancing test to allow the exemption. He found that
the marketing-hours provision was obtained, "not as a result of a bargain be-
tween the unions and some employers directed against other employers, but
pursuant to what the unions deemed to be in their own labor union in-
terests." In Furthermore, he characterized the union interest as "immediate
and direct," 12" since the provision was "intimately related" to wages, hours,
and working conditions: 3 " Thus, although the anticompetitive effect of the
agreement was "apparent and real," 131
 Justice White concluded that labor
concerns outweigh antitrust considerations in these circumstances, and he led
his colleagues to exempt this agreement from the Sherman Act.'"
Justice White's analysis effectively finds a middle ground between Justice
Douglas"" extreme deference to the antitrust laws and Justice Goldberg's
emphasis on the labor policy of promoting collective bargaining to achieve
industrial peace: 34
 Disagreeing with Justice Douglas, justice White reasoned
that an "accomodation" of labor and antitrust laws requires union immunity
in some cases in which market restrictions accompany a union-employer
agreement: 35
 Believing that no labor law is inherently preeminent, however,
he also did not agree with Justice Goldberg that the Sherman Act is overrid-
den automatically whenever the agreement concerns a mandatory bargaining
127 Id. at 666-67.lustice White determined that an agreement such as that al-
leged in Pennington would "straitjacket" the union, since it obligates the union to bar-
gain in a certain way with the employers outside of that particular bargaining unit. Id.
at 666. He concluded that "the effect on the union of such an agreement would be to
limit the free exercise of the employees' right to engage in concerted activities accord-
ing to their own views of their self-interest. In sum, we cannot conclude that the na-
tional labor policy provides any support for such agreements." Id. at 667.
'2" 381 U.S. at 688. Since at least 1919, the union, as part of its bargaining
policy, had sought determinedly to shorten night working hours. Id. at 695-97.
12" Id. at 691.
'3" Id. at 689-90. It appears that Justice White used this "intimately related"
language to distinguish agreements on non-mandatory bargaining subjects—product
prices, for example—from agreements concerning wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. As he explained in Pennington, an agreement on product prices only benefits the
union indirectly: "In such a case, the restraint on the product. market is direct and
immediate, is of the type characteristically deemed unreasonable under the Sherman
Act, and the union gets from the promise nothing more concrete than a hope for
better wages to come." 381 U.S. at 663. In Jewel Tea, on the other hand, he found that
"the particular hours of the day	 during which employees shall be required to work
are subjects well within the realm of `wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment' about which employers and unions must bargain.	 And, although the
effect on competition is apparent and real ..., the concern of union members is im-
mediate and direct." 381 U.S. at 691.
131
 Id.
'" Id. at 689-90.
1 " See text at notes 99-104 supra. Justice Douglas was concerned with the
"freedom of traders to carry on their business in their own competitive fashion,"Jewel
Tea, 381 U.S. at 737, and believed that "big business and big labor" should not be
granted "the power to remold our economy...." Pennington, 381 U.S. at 675.
134
 See text at notes 105-115 supra.
135
 See text at notes 116-17 supra.
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subject.'" In effect, then, justice White developed a test, far more delicate
than his Brothers', in which labor policies are balanced against. the antitrust
laws to determine whether the labor exemption protects a union which signs
an agreement with a non-labor group. Where, as in Jewel Tea, it is found that
both major national labor policies—that of promoting industrial peace and
that of advancing union interests—are furthered, the labor scale of justice
White's balance outweighs the antitrust sick, even where a product market
restriction exists. Pennington indicates, however, that where one of these
policies is not adequately advanced—for example, where the agreement re-
stricts the union's bargaining opportunities and where it is not sought exclu-
sively in the union's interest. 137 —justice White will ascribe far less weight to
the labor sick of the balance. In such a case, the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement. may tilt the scales toward the antitrust side, and no exemption will
be allowed.'"
Ten years after Pennington and Jewel Tea, the Supreme Court, in Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. I 00,"" endorsed a
balancing test. very similar to justice White's. Connell involved Local 100's at-
tempt. to organize subcontractors in the construction industry by inducing
general contractors to sign a "hot cargo" agreement, under which they would
only contract work to subcontractors who recognized the union as bargaining
representative.' 4 " When Connell, a general contractor, refused to sign such
an agreement, the union picketed its major construction site and ultimately
forced it to accede to the union's demand. Connell sought an injunction
against the picketing on state antitrust grounds, and Local 100 removed the
case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.'''
Connell amended its complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
agreement violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and further seeking
injunctive relic:1.' 4 '2 The district court held that the agreement was exempt
from federal antitrust laws,' 43 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.'" The Supreme Court granted certiorari.''''
"" See text at notes 119-21 supra.
07
 See text and notes at notes 124-27 ,C1ipla.
1:15
'3" 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
'4" Id. at 619. Section 8(e) of the NLIZA declares such an agreement ordinarily
to he an unfair labor practice, but. offers this exception: "provided, that nothing in this
subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organizati(m and an employer
in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction...." 29 U.S.C:. § 158(e) (1976), Local 100 argued
that this proviso explicitly allowed its agreement with Connell. 421 U.S. at 626. The
Court concluded. however. that Congress only intended this exception to allow agree-
ments between unions and employers in a collective hargaining relationship and that it
was thus irrelevant in the instant case. Id.
11) 78 L.k.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
142 421 U.S. at 620-21. Upon removal of the case to federal court, Connell
signed the agreement and amended its complaint to include the alleged Sherman Act
violation, claiming that the effect of the agreement was to exclude non-union subcon-
tractors from a portion of the market.. Id. at 621. 623.
' 4" 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
' 14 483 Ir.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
14 '' 416 U.S. 981 (1974).
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justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, explained that although the
goal of organizing subcontractors was legitimate and legal,"" the union could
not claim the statutory exemption, since its organizational efforts included an
agreement with non-labor group. 14 7 The Court continued its analysis, how-
ever, by explicitly recognizing a limited "nonstatut.ory" exemption to the anti-
trust laws,'" and considered whether Local 100 could invoke its protection.
The majority found that the agreement with Connell imposed a direct busi-
ness restraint by excluding non-union subcontractors from a portion of the
construction market.'" Where such a "substantial anti-competitive effect" 1 "
exists, the Court would not allow an exemption if the agreement "contravenes
antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor pol-
icy...." ' 5 ' The majority adhered to justice White's Pennington JewelTea
analysis, reasoning that two national labor policies have to be considered in
this labor-antitrust. balancing. Justice Powell explained that the nonstatutory
exemption derives from "the congressional policy favoring collective bar-
gaining under the NLRA" and from "the strong labor policy favoring the asso-
ciation of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working
conditions." 152
 The majority concluded that neither of these policies was
promoted sufficiently by the hot cargo agreement, since the signatories were not
in a collective bargaining relationship, and since the anticompetitive effects.did
not "follow naturally" from the elimination of substandard working condi-
tions. 153
 The Court. would not allow the antitrust laws to be overridden
where neither policy was advanced.' 54
'4" 421 U.S. at 624-25.
Id. at 622, 623. Interestingly, Connell did not involve a third party challenge
of a union-employer agreement; Connell was a party to the agreement. Even though
the Apex Hosiery Court's fear of an employer "using -
 a union to restrain competition
was not present, the Connell Court nevertheleSs read Hutcheson's "combination with
non-labor" restriction literally to deny the statutory exemption. See Note, Labor's Anti-
trust Exemption After Connell, 36 01110 ST. L. J. 852, 869 (1975).
l" 421 U.S. at 622.
1 " Id. at 623,
'5" Id. at. 625. Connell involved no allegation of any employer group conspiracy
to restrain product market. competition, as had Pennington.	 625 n.2. Thus, the
antitrust side of the balance was weighted exclusively by the anticompetitive effects of
the agreement. Cf: Note, Labor Law-Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions: Connell Construc-
tion Co, v. Plumbers Local 100, 17 B.C. INn. & Cont. L. Rrv. 217, 224 (1976) (effects
alone determinative of union's antitrust exemption) [hereinafter cited as B.C. Nora
' 5 ' 421 U.S. 625.
152
 Id, at 622.
153 Id. at 625. The Court determined that because the union had no interest in
representing Connell's employees, and because the anticompetitive provision was not
contained in a collective bargaining agreement. the federal policy favoring collective
bargaining could not protect the union. Id. at 625-26. Moreover, it found that the
agreement "indiscriminately" harmed the market position of certain subctintractors,
"even if their competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages and
working conditions but rather from more efficient operating methods.'' Id. at 623. The
majority concluded, therefore, that the union interest in eliminating competition based
on wages and working conditions was not furthered sufficiently by the agreement to
override the antitrust laws. Id. at 625.
154 Id. at 635.
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When viewed in conjunction with Justice White's lead opinions in Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea, Connell outlines the general contours of the nonstatut-
ory labor exemption, while underscoring the delicacy of the Supreme Court's
labor-antitrust balancing approach. The Connell Court held that the exemp-
tion does not protect a union's agreement with a non-labor group where the
agreement produces direct business restraints, and where neither the collective
bargaining policy nor the elimination of substandard labor conditions policy is
advanced. The Court would not allow the exemption even though there was
no allegation of an employer group conspiracy, as in Pennington, and even
though a concededly legitimate labor goal underlay the agreement. Justice
White's Jewel Tea opinion, on the other hand, stands for the proposition that a
union may claim the exemption, provided the union concern is "direct and
immediate" and the restriction is "intimately related" to wages, hours, and
working conditions—that is, where both major labor policies are advanced by
the agreement.
The breadth of the labor exemption in the area between these two
cases—where only one labor policy is promoted by the agreement—is far less
clear. That the Court was willing to analyze the Connell agreement. although it
was not the product of collective bargaining,'" suggests that it might allow
the exemption where union interests are advanced sufficiently to outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement.'" By the same token, one could
seize upon an enigmatic dictum in Connell to argue that the exemption also
applies where no union interest is advanced, but where the restrictive provi-
sion is included in a collective bargaining agreement. Having found the hot
cargo agreement to curtail competition based on efficiency, as well as on dif-
ferences in labor standards, the Court added, "Where can be no argument in
this case, whatever its force in other contexts, that a restraint. of this mag-
nitude might be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a
lawful collective-bargaining agreement." 1 " The facts of Connell, however,
together with the Court's failure to overrule Pennington, militate against inter-
preting this dictum as an acceptance of Justice Goldberg's extreme deference
to collective bargaining policy. Justice Powell's statement more properly
should be read in the light of the Court's explicit finding that a union organi-
zational interest did exist in Connell. His dictum thus accords with Justice
White's reasoning that the exemption protects a restrictive provision which is
included in a collective bargaining agreement and which also sufficiently ad-
vances a union concern. The White-Connell balancing test would still reach the
Pennington result by disallowing the exemption where union interests are not
sufficiently advanced, and where product market competition is unduly re-
strained, by an agreement with a non-labor group.
"5 See B.C. NoTF., supra note 150, at 224.
158 For example, the Court might have allowed the exemption had it found
that the union interest in eliminating substandard working conditions, as well as its
organizational interest, underlay the agreement. See note 153 and text at note 146
supra.
' 57
 421 U.S. at 625-26.
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THE NONSTATUTORY EXEMPTION CLAIMED
BY NON-LABOR GROUPS:
THE CASES PRIOR TO MCCOURT
With the exception of Jewel Tea, the Supreme Court decisions on the
labor exemption have involved only union defendants, and the issue always
has been under what circumstances a union can claim the exemption to pro-
tect anticompetitive behavior undertaken in its self-interest.. Even in Jewel Tea,
where an employer group was joined with the unions as a defendant, Justice
White framed the issue as whether the'labor exemption protects the "unions'
successful attempt" to include a restrictive provision in a bargaining agree-
ment "in pursuit of their own labor union policies." ' 58
 A majority of the
Supreme Court. has never addressed the question faced by the Sixth Circuit in
McCourt: under what circumstances—if any—an employer group may claim the
exemption to protect an anticompetitive provision devised and sought by the
employers in their own interest.' 59
With only the Hutcheson-Connell line of cases as guidance, lower courts
have struggled with this issue in a number of contexts, including professional
sports. In a series of cases involving antitrust challenges to professional sports
leagues' reserve systems, the leagues have raised the labor exemption de-
fense.'" Prior to MeCourl, the courts always had rejected this defense,'"
"8 381 U.S. at 689-90 (emphasis added).
15 " Justice Goldberg's/ewe/ Tea analysis would allow either party to a bargaining
agreement to immunize any agreement on wages, hours, and working conditions. Con-
gress had mandated that both sides bargain over these subjects and, in justice
Goldberg's words, "Mt would seem the height of unfairness ... to penalize employers
for the discharge of their statutory duty to bargain on wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, which duty, this Court has held, requires the employer
to enter into a signed contract with the union embodying the collective bargaining
terms agreed upon." 381 U.S. at 730. Under this analysis, the exemption would extend
to employers even if they had initiated the mandatory bargaining provision in their
own interest, since only then would judicial "roaming at large"—in the form of an
"inquiry into the purpose and motive of the employer and union ..."— be foreclosed.
Id. at 716. Justice Goldberg's approach has never been accepted by a majority of the
Court.
"" The 1970s have witnessed a series of antitrust challenges to the established
professional sports leagues' reserve systems. It is beyond the scope of this study to
examine these•cases in detail. For an excellent comprehensive treatment of antitrust
law in the context of professional sports, see. J. WEisTART S.: C. LowELL, THE LAW or
SPowrs, §§ 5.01-5.07 at 477-629 (1979). See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)
(baseball); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (football); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F.
Supp. 904 (E,D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (hockey); Robertson
v. National Basketball Association, 389 F. Stipp. 867 (S,D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Stipp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey). Gerard & Schlafly , The Eighth Circuit Suggests a Labor
Exemption from Antitrust Laws for Collectively Bargained Labor Agreements in Professional
Sports, 21 Sr. Louis U.L.J. 565 (1977); Brody, The Impact of Litigation on Professional
Sports, 14 TRIAL 35 (1978); Lee. A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control
Mechanisms under Antitrust and Labor Law Princ iples: Peace at Last, 11 VAL, U.L. REV. 373
(1977); Note, Antitrust—Professional Football: The Rozelle Rule as an Unreasonable Restraint
of Trade, 26 KAN. L. REV. 121 (1977).
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Briefly and generally stated, these cases involved player attacks on the leagues'
player control mechanisms as being illegal restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.
15 U.S.C. I and 2 (1976). It was usually alleged, inter alia, that the team owners had
conspired to restrain competition for player services by instituting a "group boycott,"
in the form of the reserve or option clause. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265-66; Mackey, 543 F.2d
at 609. It was argued that the purpose of the restrictive devices was to lessen competi-
tion for players among franchises and that the effect was severely to restrict a player's
ability I market his professional athletic services. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1197 n.7; see
WEISTART & LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07 at 594-95. The owners countered
that the sports industry's viability can only be maintained with such anticompetitive
devices. Absent restraints on player movement, the reasoning went, the wealthier,
more successful, or more attractively located clubs would stockpile a disproportionate
share of the player talent; relative parity among the member teams would be itnpossi-
IA to achieve; spectators would not pay to watch uneven contests; and the whole
league—owners and players alike—would stiffer the economic consequences. Mackey,
543 F.2d at 621; Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 892; WEISTART & LOWELL, THE LAW or
SPORTS § 5.07 at 595-97; Note, Keeping the Illusion Alive: The Public Interest in Profes-
sional Sports, 12 SurFout U.L. REV. 48, 57-63 (1978). Moreover, the leagues contended
that the labor exemption sheltered them from antitrust liability, since the systems al-
legedly were the products of bona fide, arm's length collective bargaining. Mackey, 543
F.2d at 609; Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 881-82; Philadelphia hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. at
496.
Prior to McCowl, the courts had been quite receptive to the players' arguments,
while always disallowing the owners' claims to the labor exemption. Mackey, 543 F.2c1
606; Robertson, 380 F. Supp. 867; Philadlephia Hockey Club, 351 F.2c1 462. The one
exception was the Supreme Court's decision in Flood v. Kuhn, which declared baseball
to be.outside the scope of the antitrust laws. 407 U.S. at 284. This was, however, an
"exception and an anomaly ... confined to baseball." which stemmed from an ex-
tremely rigid application of the doctrine of' stare decisis. Id. at 282. Lower courts, prior
to McCourt, had sustained antitrust challenges to the reserve systems of the major pro-
fessional sports leagues. In Robertson, 389 F. Supp. 867 (players' antitrust action against
the National Basketball Association for conspiring to restrain competition in the player
service market), the District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the
National Basketball Association's (NBA) motion for summary judgment. on the reserve
system issue, noting the system's similarity to such per se antitrust violations as group
boycotts, price-fixing schemes, and horizontal market divisions. Id. at 803-04. The
NBA settled the case before the legality of its reserve system could he tested fully in a
trial on the merits. The settlement Caine in conjunction with a comprehensive collective
bargaining agreement signed in April 1076, tinder which the NBA agreed to phase
out of the most restrictive elements of the reserve system by the 1981-82 season. WEIS-
TART & LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.03 at 507-08; Lee, supra note 6 at 400-01
Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, involved an attack by a rival league (the
World Hockey Association) on the "established" league's (NHL) reserve system. The
District. Court for the Eastern District of' Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction
against. enforcement of the rule, finding that. the NHL had used this system to exercise
monopoly power ill controlling the ,supply of professional hockey players. Id, at 518.
Football's reserve system was attacked by players in Mackey, 543 F.2d 606. The Eighth
Circuit held that the "Rozelle Rule" (the compensation provision which formed the
backbone of the reserve system, named after National Football League (NFL) Commis-
sioner Alvin "Pete" Rozelle) was more restrictive than was necessary to serve the
legitimate business purposes of the NFL, and that, therefore, it violated the Sherman
Act. Mackey, 542 F.2d at 622. The football owners, like their basketball c ou nterparts,
were forced to modify their reserve system, which modifications were agreed to by the
players in March 1977 as part of a new Collective Bargaining Agreement. WEISTART &
LOwELL, THE LAW or SPORTS § 5.03 at 513-14.
'"' Mackey, 543 F.2d at 742; Smith v. Pro-Football. 420 F. Stipp. 738, 742
(D.D.C. 1976); Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia Hockey
Club, 351 F. Supp. at 496.
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often using language suggesting that an employer group can never claim the
exemption to protect an employer-devised reserve system. For example, in
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, hc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,'" the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the NHL had
perpetuated a monopolistic reserve system"" which the Players' Association
persistently had opposed.'" 4 The court distinguished the Hutcheson-Connell
line of cases on these facts, noting, "Mirst, those cases all involved situations
where the union had been sued ... , and the union, not the employer, sought
to invoke the labor exemption. ... Second, ... [those cases] pertained to is-
sues which furthered the interests of the union members and on which there
had been extensive collective bargaining." 1"5 The court concluded that the
employer group, NHL, "is not a beneficiary of ... Uewel Tea, a] decision in
behalf of the union."'" Similarly, in Robertson v. National Basketball Associa-
tion,"'' another players' antitrust action against a professional sports league,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York suggested that the
labor exemption is never available to employer groups. In denying the Na-
tional Basketball Association's motion for summary judgment on the reserve
system issue, the court wrote that the labor exemption was created for the
benefit of unions,'" and that it "extends only to labor or union activities, and
not to the activities of employers."'" The court concluded that the basic
inquiry should be whether the anticompetitive provisions were in the union's
own interests.'" Similar assertions and intimations can be found in other
sports cases. 17 '
'' 351 F. Stipp. at 462; see note 160 supra. •
163 Id. at 500.
"4 Id. at 498.
Id. at 498-99.
166 Id. at 498.
167 389 F. Stipp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see note 160 supra.
'' hi at 886.
1 "" Id. at 885.
170 Id. at 889.
' 7 ' Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Stipp. 738 (D.I).C. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Smith involved a player's antitrust challenge to the National Football League draft
system. The court rejected the League's labor exemption defense on the ground that
at the time the plaintiff was drafted, the players' union had not agreed to the draft in
a collective bargaining agreement. 420 F. Stipp. at 742. In dicta, the court went on to
consider whether a collective bargaining agreement would have immunized the draft.
The court intimated that one of the criteria for granting such immunity should be that
the agreement be "the result of the union's own efforts in its self-interest. free of any agree-
ment with or among the employers to attempt to accomplish these objectives." Id. at 743 (em-
phasis added). See Lee, supra note 6, at 420; Note. The NFL Draft and the Antitrust
Laws—The Player Draft of the National Football League Held to Violate the Federal Antitrust
LaWS, S'inith v. Pro -Football, 41 ALB. L. Rev. 154 (1977). Accord, Kapp v. National Foot-
ball League. 390 F. Stipp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), all d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
dismissed, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). Kapp held that because the record showed no collective
bargaining to have taken place with regard to the NFL's reserve system, the labor
exemption would not apply. Id. at 85. Then, in dicta, the court intimated that the
exemption "does not and should not go so far as to permit immunized combinations to
enforce employer-employee agreements which, being unreasonable restrictions on an
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The language which intimates that an employer group can never claim
the labor exemption loses much of its force when it is recognized that the
pre-McCourt sports cases all were decided on narrower grounds than the
above-cited passages might suggest. No court ever disallowed a league's claim
to the exemption solely on the ground that the reserve system was initiated by
the employer group in its own interest. Although the tenor of certain opin-
'ions indicates that such a finding alone might have been determinative of these
cases, each decision was based upon a finding that the reserve system had not
been the subject of legitimate collective bargaining, but rather had been im-
posed unilaterally by the respective leagues and team owners. For example,
the Philadelphia Hockey Club court's rejection of the precedential value offewel
Tea was based not only on its determination that the NHL reserve system did
not further the interests of union members,'" but also on its finding that the
system was never a subject of serious, arm's length bargaining.'" Similarly,
the Robertson court's broad assertion that the labor exemption extends "only to
labor or union activities, and not to the activities of employers," '" should be
read in the light of the entire opinion. The court continued its analysis by
recognizing "the possibility of a circumscribed exemption for employers ... , "
which would afford protection to certain collective bargaining agreements.' 75
It held that the evidence as to whether the reserve system was the "subject of
serious bargaining ... or whether [it was] baldly imposed by the NBA" was
conflicting and could only be passed upon at trial.'" Writing that "resolution
of this conflict may be the most critical issue in this litigation,' the court.
refused to grant the League's motion for summary judgment.'" In each of
the other major sports cases involving this issue, the court stated explicitly that
its decision to disallow the labor exemption rested upon its finding that the
reserve system was not the product of bona fide collective bargaining.' 7 "
employee's right tO freely seek and choose his employment, have been held illegal on
grounds of public policy long before and entirely apart from the antitrust laws." Id. at
86 (emphasis in original). No other court has adhered to this line of reasoning, and it
has been severely criticized by most commentators. See WE1START & LOWELL, THE LAW
or SPORTS at 573-75; Gerard & Schlafly, The Eighth Circuit Suggests a Labor Exemption
from Antitrust Laws for Collectively Bargained Labor Agreements in Professional Sports, 21 ST.
Louts U.L.J. 565 at n.128; Lee, supra note 6, at 419.
172 315 F. Supp. at 498.
"3 Id.
"" 389 F. Stipp. at 885.
175 Id. at 886. Such an exemption for employers would, in the court's words,
"arise derivatively, and become effective when employers are sued by third parties for
the activities of unions.... [T]he protection of the exemption is afforded only to -
employers who have acted jointly with the labor organization in connection with or in
preparation for collective bargaining negotiations." Id.
"6 Id. at 895.
'7 Id.
178 Id. at 896. The court indicated the direction its inquiry would take when
the case was tried on the merits: "Conceivably, if the restrictions were part of the
union policy deemed by the Players' Association to he in the players' best interest, they
could be exempt from the antitrust laws [citations omitted]. The proper inquiry in
respect of this controversy is whether the challenged restraints were ever the subject of
serious, intensive, arm's-length collective bargaining." Id. at 895.
17" Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616; Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 742, and see note 171 supra;
Kapp, 390 F. Stipp. at 85, and see note 171 supra.
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These sports decisions which disallow the exemption to leagues and own-
ers in the absence of legitimate collective bargaining, thus do not stand for the
broader proposition that an employer group may never claim the labor
exemption to protect a restrictive provision sought in its self-interest. Rather,
in accord with the Supreme Court's lest, these cases hold that where neither
the labor policy of furthering union interests, nor that of promoting collective
bargaining are advanced, the employer group—like the union—cannot claim
the exemption to immunize an anticompetitive provision.
Outside of the sports context, although several lower court decisions
prior to McCourt allowed the labor exemption to an employer group,'" not
one was decided solely on the ground that the restrictive provision was in-
cluded in a collective bargaining agreement. Again, however, certain language
might suggest. a more expansive interpretation td these opinions than the un-
derlying facts would warrant. For example, in Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco
Corp."" the Third Circuit discussed whether an employer ever could claim the
labor exemption and wrote:
We reject Scooper Dooper's contention that the labor exemption is
unavailable to employers. ... To preserve the integrity of the
negotiating process, employers who bargain in good faith must be enti-
tled to claim the antitrust exemption.... The labor exemption to the
antitrust laws applies to the bargaining agreement, the product of
negotiations between unions and management.'"
This language suggests Justice Goldberg's approach, under which both
employer and employee groups may claim the labor exemption to protect any
collective bargaining agreement on mandatory bargaining subjects.'" Scooper
Dooper, however, involved a provision contained in a bargaining agreement at
the union's behest and in its self-interest; 184 it. thus does not stand for the
'"" California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Associated General Contrac-
tors of" America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977); Scooper
Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974); National Ass'n of Broad-
cast Employees and Technicians v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, 488 F:2d 124 (9th Cir. 1973); Intercontinental Transport Corp. v. New
York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970); see notes 182, 185 infra.
"I 494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974).
"2 Id, at 847, 11,14 (emphasis added). Scooper Dooper previously had chal-
lenged an allegedly anticompetitive provision contained in a bargaining agreement be-
tween a union and its employer, Kraftco. National Dairy Products Corporation v. Milk
Drivers and Dairy Employees Union Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The
court in that action had found that the union was entitled to the labor exemption. Id.
at 986. Scooper Dooper involved one of the plaintiffs from the original action attempting
to re-try the labor exemption issue in the context of alleged "changed circumstances."
494 F.2d at 847, The Third Circuit found "no changed circumstances of controlling
legal significance" and held that Scooper Dooper was collaterally estoppecl from re-
trying the issue. Id. at 850. It was in the process of' rejecting Scooper Dooper's conten-
tion that the issues presented in the instant case differed from the first merely because
the defendant was now the employer, rather than the union signatory to the bargain-
ing agreement, that the Third Circuit discussed the scope of the nonstatutory labor
exemption. Id.
1"3 See note 159 supra.
184 See National Dairy Products, 308 F. Supp. at 986.
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proposition that either bargaining party may claim the labor exemption to
protect any restrictive provision which results from good faith collective bar-
gaining on mandatory subjects, without regard to which party sought the pro-
vision. Other pre-McCourt cases which extend the exemption to employers also
have narrow holdings which do not support such a proposition."'"
The holdings of these cases allowing employers to claim the exemption
accord with the Supreme Court's balancing approach. Where a union seeks to
further a legitimate labor interest via a bargaining agreement with an
employer group, the Supreme Court has ruled that labor policies outweigh
ensuing product market restrictions and that the union may claim the labor
exemption.'" Subjecting the employer signatories to antitrust liability in
these circumstances would emasculate the nonstatutory exemption, since an
affected third party could attack the anticompetitive provision simply by mov-
ing against the employer, rather than against the union signatory."' It does
im' See, e.g., Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York Shipping
Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970), in which the Second Circuit found that a union,
"acting solely in its own self-interest, 'bad] forced reluctant employers to yield to cer-
tain of its [legitimate labor] demands," which then were included in a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Id. at 888. The court held that, "Fithider these circumstances the
resulting agreement is within the protection of the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws," and the defendant employer group was absolved of antitrust liability. Id. at
888-89.
See also National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians v. Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 488 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1973), in which
the Ninth Circuit dismissed an antitrust action against an alleged union-employer
combination on the ground that the unions were acting "in their own lawful self-
interest" to protect job opportunities from the effects of wage competition. Id. at 125.
The court would not expose the employer group to antitrust liability under these cir-
cumstances. Id. at 126.
Cf. California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Associated General Contractors
of America, San Diego Chapter, Inc., 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977). Here, the Ninth
Circuit allowed both the employer and the union parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to claim the labor exemption. The court used disarmingly broad language
when it wrote "The ... [collective bargaining agreement] pertains to wages. hours, and
working conditions. These are mandatory bargaining subjects. Thus the ... [collective
bargaining agreement]. by itself, does not violate the federal antitrust laws." Id. at 614.
The court's presentation of the evidence did not indicate that the restrictive provision
had been sought in the employers' interest. This, together with the court's reference to
justice White's proscription against restrictions sought "at the behest of ... nonlabor
groups," id. at 614, militates against reading this case to afford protection to any mar-
ket restraint resulting from mandatory collective bargaining, even if initiated and
sought by the employers.
8" See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676.
"7 Note how this would undermine both congressional labor policies. Whether
the defendant is the union or the employer, the union's goal of furthering labor in-
terests would be thwarted if such an agreement could be invalidated on antitrust.
grounds. By the same token, employers might. hesitate to enter into collective bargain-
ing agreements with labor groups, lest this "combination" expose diem to antitrust
liability. Gerard 8: Schlally, The Eighth Circuit Suggests a Labor Exemption from Antitrust
Laws for Collectively Bargained Labor Agreements in Professional Sports, 21 Si', Louts U.L.J.
at 589. Both the labor policies of advancing union into vests and of promoting collective
bargaining to achieve industrial peace thus would he frustrated if' an affected third
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not follow, and no case prior to McCourt held, that the employer group
should be able to claim the exemption where a product market restriction
occurs in circumstances where both labor policies are not advanced. The Su-
preme Court, in Pennington, indicated that the inclusion of a business restraint
in a collective bargaining agreement does not immunize a union where union
interests are not sufficiently advanced.'" One would be hard-pressed to
make an argument that an employer group's right to the labor exemption
should be greater than the union's.
In another pre-McCourt decision, Mackey v. National Football League,'" the
Eight Circuit reached a result consistent with both the Supreme Court's enun-
ciation and prior lower court applications of the nonstatutory labor exemption
balancing test. The court., however, used this opinion to forge the shield
which later would protect the NHL in McCourt.'" Mackey involved a player
group's challenge of the National Football League's ("NFL") reserve system on
antitrust grounds. Based on its finding that the reserve system was never the
subject of bona tide collective bargaining,'" the Eighth Circuit rejected the
NFL's claim to the labor exemption 1 2
 and held that this system unreasonably
restrained trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'"" Mackey's.
narrow holding—that an employer group can not claim the labor exemption
to protect an employer-devised player restraint where there has been no bona
fide collective bargaining—was in accord with prior case law, since neither
union interests nor the national collective bargaining policy are advanced in
these circumstances.
The Eighth Circuit, however, also examined the circumstances under
which the labor exemption will apply where there has been bona fide collec-
tive bargaining."' In the course of this inquiry, the court, while acknowledg-
ing the balancing approach toward applying the nonstatutory exemption,'"
departed from prior analyses in two important respects. First, the Eighth Cir-
cuit seemed to accord a higher value to the labor policy of promoting the
collective bargaining process than to that of advancing union interests. It
stressed that the nonstatutory exemption's roots lie in the national policy
favoring collective bargaining,'" and relegated to a brief footnote a reference
party, although prevented from moving against the union, could attack the agreement
by choosing the employer signatory as the defendant. Although Justice White did not
make this argument explicit in Jewel Tea, it seems that it underlay his :Jump from
framing the issue as "whether ... the unions' successful attempt to obtain [the
marketing-hours] provision ... falls within the protection of the national labor policy'
and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act, - 381 U.S. at 689-90 (emphasis added),
to concluding that the agreement (and therefore the union and employer defendant-
signatories) was not illegal under the antitrust laws. Id. at 691.
1 " See text at note 137 supra.
1 • 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
10" See text at notes 212-233 infra.
543 F.2d at 616.
j '"r2 Id.
Id. at 622.
ON Id. at 613-14.
" 5 Id. at 613.
'''" Id. at 611, 612, 614.
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to the policy of eliminating substandard working conditions."' Second, the
court recognized that the restrictiveness of an anticompetitive provision in-
cluded in a bargaining agreement which affects only parties to the agreement
is less weighty than the restrictiveness of a similar provision which affects
third parties. The Eighth Circuit distinguished the Hutcheson to Connell line of
cases as involving restraints on the trade of competitors of the business group
signatories."' In Mackey, on the other hand, the reserve system affected only
professional football players, whose union representatives had signed the bar-
gaining agreement."' The court cited Justice Powell's Connell dictun -1 2" to
support its conclusion that "the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially he given preeminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint
on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relation-
shi p. -201
The Eighth Circuit thus fashioned a test balancing the interests involved
in Mackey. For the court, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining would
prevail over the antitrust laws where (1) the restraint on trade is included in a
collective bargaining agreement as a result of bona Fick, arm's length bargain-
ing; (2) the bargaining agreement concerns mandatory bargaining subjects;
and (3) the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the agree-
nt .202 Whether the restrictive provision was sought by the union or
whether it promotes union interests is not a focus of inquiry under the Mackey
1 " 7 Id. at 612 n.9.
"" Id. at 613-14. The court cited Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Hood,
supra note 160. in which it was written: "It is apparent that none of the prior cases is
precisely in point. They involve union-management agreements that work to the de-
triment of management's competitors. In this case, petitioner urges that the reserve
system works to the detriment of labor." 543 F.2d at 614 n.12 (quoting from Flood,
supra note 160, 407 U.S. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting)),
"" 543 F.2d at 609, 610..
2 "" Id. at 614 n.13. The Eighth Circuit quoted the language discussed in the
text at note 157 supra, where Justice Powell wrote: "There can be no argument in this
case whatever its force in other contexts, that a restraint of this magnitude might he
entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were included in a lawful collective bargaining
agreement." 421 li.S. at 625-26. Mackey's differentiation between agreements which
affect third parties and those which affect only the signatories seems to stem from the
court's reading of the '!in other contexts" language as implying a situation where the
agreement does not affect third parties, as it did in Connell. Justice Powell's dictum,
however, might be read more accurately as pointing towards another situation, in
which the union does have an interest in representing the employers' workers, whether
or not a third party is affected by the agreement. The Mackey court chose not to quote
Justice Powell's following sentences, which read: "In this case, Local 100 had no in-
terest in representing Connelfs employees. The federal policy favoring collective bar-
gaining therefore can offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell
or its campaign to exclude nonunion firms from the subcontracting market.'' Id. at
(1 96.
All this is not to say that the Eighth Circuit's ascription of lesser weight to an
agreement which affects only the parties to it is invalid. It is merely suggested that the
court's reliance on Justice Powell's dictum in support of this proposition is misplaced.
2 " 1 543 F.2d at 614.
2112 Id.
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test. Despite the Eighth Circuit's emphasis on collective bargaining policy,'"
however, one should not read Mackey as suggesting that whenever bona fide
negotiations on mandatory bargaining subjects have taken place, the resulting
agreement is protected by the labor exemption.204 The Eighth Circuit's test
only applies where the trade restraint exclusively affects parties to the agree-
ment. In such circumstances, the court would lessen the weight. of the anti-
trust scale to such an extent that the advancement of one labor policy—that of
promoting the collective bargaining process—could invoke the labor exemp-
tion.
IV'. MCCOURT: THE LABOR EXEMPTION
SHIELDING AN ANTICOMPETITIVE PROVISION
DEVISED BY A NON-LABOR GROUP IN ITS INTEREST
The NHL's attempt to protect its reserve system with the nonstatutory
labor exemption must be viewed against this background. From Hutcheson to
Connell, the Supreme Court. has concentrated upon union claims to antitrust
immunity to protect union interests. 205
 Under the Court's balancing test, a
product. market restriction escapes antitrust scrutiny only if both the labor -
policies of furthering union interests and of promoting the collective bargain-
ing process are advanced. 20" Certain lower court. dicta suggest that employers
may never claim the exemption. 207 The better reasoned, and more widely
held position is that where a union includes an anticompetitive provision in a
bargaining agreement in its own self-interest, the union's and the employers'
immunity is coextensive. 208
 Prior to McCourt, however, no court had allowed
either, party to claim the labor exemption solely because the provision was
included in a collective bargaining agreement; 21 " the labor exemption's pro-
tection was never extended to an employer-devised scheme."° The Eighth
Circuit indicated that it would allow the exemption to protect em ployer-
initiated provisions where no third party was affected and where the market
203 It is important to emphasize that in delineating its test, the Eighth Circuit
assumed that the only "relevant" labor policy to be balanced against the Sherman Act,
id. at 613, is that favoring collective bargaining. Id. at 614.
20 Cf. Id. at 614 n.14, where the court refers to justice Goldberg's Jewel Tea
opinion but then adds: "That test, however, has never been adopted by a majority of
the Supreme Court. Rather, a majority of the Court seems to favor an accommodation
less heavily weighted in favor of labor policy." The Eighth Circuit left open the ques-
tion whether its ascription of greater weight to collective bargaining policy than to
union interests policy could ever warrant the application of the exemption where a
third party is affected by a restrictive provision, but where no legitimate labor interest
is advanced within the bargaining agreement containing the market restraints. '[his
issue will be discussed in greater detail below.
205 See text at notes 158-59 supra.
"0 See text at notes 124-57 supra.
"' See text at notes 161-71 supra.
208
 National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees, 488 F.2d 124; Intercontinental Container
Transport Corp., 426 F.2d 884; Scooper Dooper, 494 F.2d 840; see text at notes 180-88
supra.
209 See text at notes 184-88 supra.
219 Id.
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restraint results from bona fide collective bargaining on mandatory bargaining
subjects, but. this reasoning was developed in the course of an inquiry far
broader than that necessary to support the limited holding of Mackey. 2 '
If the narrow holding of Mackey in any way lessened the import of the
courts broader inquiry, the full significance of the Eighth Circuit's analysis
became manifest in McCourt. The Sixth Circuit "assumed without deciding"
that the NHE's reserve system might contravene the Sherman Act212 and then
focused on the labor exemption issue. The majority accepted without question
the Mackey criteria, stating that the Eighth Circuit had properly enunciated
"the governing principles" in determining whether the nonstatutory labor
exemption applies to the reserve system provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement in professional sports. 213 It also agreed with the Mackey court that
the first two criteria had been met in the instant. case: the reserve system
primarily affected the players, a party to the bargaining relationship, 2 " and it
was a mandatory bargaining subject, within the meaning of section 8(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act.' In holding that the reserve system was im-
munized from antitrust scrutiny, based upon its finding that it was the pro-
duct of good faith, arm's length bargaining, however, the Sixth Circuit
reached a result different from that reached by both the Eighth Circuit in
Mackey and the district. court in the instant case. In so doing, it became the
first court to uphold an employer group's claim to the labor exemption to
immunize an employer-devised restraint sought in the employers' interest.
2 " See text at notes 189-204 supra.
212 600 F.2d 1193, 11517. The Sixth Circuit noted that "Mower court activity
has almost unillirmly indicated that the restraints of the reserve system in sports other
than baseball amount to a type of group boycott against a player who desires to sell his
professional athletic services to another team after having earlier been engaged by a
competing team." Id. at 1197 n.7. It also pointed out, however, that the Supreme
Court ''has never directly ruled upon whether the reserve system common to most
professional athletics comes within the ban of the Sherman Act...." Id. at 1197. The
Sixth Circuit's reluctance to endorse wholeheartedly lower court decisions on this issue
may stem from a recognition that Apex Hosiery has never been overruled and that a
decision on the reserve system's antitrust liability, arguably, could he based on a find-
ing that a restraint on labor market competition is not the kind of anticompetitive
behavior at which the Sherman Act was aimed. See note 85 supra. The Sixth Circuit
:tvoidecl the issue, whether this type of restraint falls within the Sherman Act's cover-
age, by holding that the labor exemption immunizes section 9A from antitrust
scrutiny. 600 F.2d at 1203.
213
	 at 1197.
214 Id
. 
at 1198. As the court noted, the only rival league. the World Hockey
Association, had agreed to the NFIL's reserve system as part of the settlement to the
Philadelphia Hockey Club litigation. Id. at 11.8.
2 ' 3 Id. Tillie agreement concerning the reserve system involves in a very real
sense the terms and conditions of employment of the hockey players both in form and
in practical effect. As Mackey correctly points out, the restriction upon a player's ability
to move from one team to another within the league. the financial interest which the
hockey players have and their interest in the mechanics of the operation and enforce-
ment. of the rule strongly indicate that it is a mandatory bargaining subject within the
meaning of The National Labor Relations Act. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. I58(d)
(1976)." Id. See also Jacobs k Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by
Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1, 11-12 (1971).
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The district court's finding that by-law section 9A was not the product of
collective bargaining 216 was based on its conclusions that (I) the by-law was
imposed unilaterally upon the NHLPA and was incorporated into the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement in the identical language it contained when first
adopted by the League, 217 and (2) new benefits to players in the 1976 Agree-
ment were not directly related to bargaining on section 9A. 218 The trial
judge wrote that the purpose of the by-law's inclusion in the Agreement was
merely "to give the impression that it was a bargained-for provision." 2 " This
purpose, which, according to the court, did not reflect good faith bargaining,
would not immunize the signatories from antitrust sanctions, since, in the
court's words, "[w]hen labor and non-labor groups combine to insert into a
collective bargaining agreement a non-negotiated provision, courts will not af-
ford either party the non-statutory labor exemption." 220
The Sixth Circuit's reversal of the trial court's decision was based on its
contrary finding that the NHL reserve system was the product of' good faith,
arm's length bargaining."' The majority concluded that the trial court had
failed to recognize the well established principle that nothing in the
labor law compels either part negotiating over mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining to yield on its initial bargaining position. Good
faith bargaining is all that. is required. That the position of one party
on an issue prevails unchanged does not mandate the conclusion that
there was no collective bargaining over the issue. 222
The court stated that it was irrelevant that section 9A was not bargained for
by the NHLPA, provided it was bargained over.223 The court. highlighted two
lines of evidence establishing that the reserve system was bargained over.
First, the court noted that at various times, the NHLPA had refused to meet
with the owners to discuss the reserve system further, had attempted to de-
velop an alternative system, had threatened to strike, had threatened to bring
an antitrust suit against the League, and had threatened to recommend that
the players not report to training camp.'224 Despite this negotiating pressure,
the owners stood firm in their insistence on section 9A.225
 The court con-
cluded "what the trial court saw as a failure to negotiate was in fact. simply the
failure to succeed, after the most intensive negotiations, in keeping an un-
wanted provision out. of the contract."t 2 " The Sixth Circuit viewed the "sig-
nificantly new benefits to the players" included in the 1976 Agreement as the
21 " 460 F. Stipp. at 911.
217 Id. at 910.
218 Id. at 911.
21 9 id.
2211 I&
221 See text at notes 49-56 supra.
222
 600 F.2d at 1200.
22" Id. at 1203.
224
 Id. at 1202.
225 ird,
2211 Id. at 1203.
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second line of persuasive evidence of bargaining over the reserve system. 227
The court concluded that the NHLPA had bargained for these new benefits
"in connection with" the reserve system 228 and that to retain section 9A, the
League had yielded significantly on other issues. 22 "
This discussion of new player benefits does not require reading McCourt
to imply that union interests must be advanced for the labor exemption to
apply. The NHL argued that it is not the restrictive provision alone, but the
agreement as a whole, that must inure. to the employees' benefit for "union
interests" to weigh on the labor scale." ° Although certain language in prior
cases fails to support the NHL's contention,"' the Sixth Circuit easily could
have based its decision on a finding that the NHLPA agreed to the reserve
system "as part. of a package which the union deems to be in the best interests
of the employees,"232 and, therefore, that both collective bargaining policy and
union interests were advanced sufficiently to outweigh any accompanying re-
straints on track. Rather than characterizing the new player benefits as de-
terminative of the "union interest" issue, however, the court chose to view
them as quid pro quos, which indicated that the bona fide bargaining require-
ment had been met.
The Sixth Circuit's characterization of the significance of the new player
benefits enabled it to express its views on two aspects of the labor exemption
which have never been addressed by the Supreme Court. Had it chosen to
view the benefits not only as evidence of bona fide bargaining, but als6 as
establishing that the national policy of eliminating substandard working condi-
tions had been advanced sufficiently by the Agreement, the court only would
227 Id. at 1202. These benefits included increased pension benefits. bonus
money, and expense allowances, as well as modified waiver procedures, schedule, and
travel plans. Id. at 11.12.
228 Id. at 1203.
22" Id. at 1202.
230 Brief of Appellant, NHL, at 47-52.
231 In Jewel Tea, justice White framed the issue as, "whether the marketing-
hours restriction„like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours
and working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision
through bona fide, amt's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies .
falls within the protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from
the Sherman Act." 381 U.S. at 689-90 (emphasis added). And in Flood, Itist.ic.e. Marshall
wrote: "This Court has faced the interrelationship between the antitrust laws and the
labor laws before. The decisions make several things clear. First, 'benefits to organized
labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out of the antitrust
fires.' United Slates v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949)." 407 U.S. at 294 (Marshall, J.. dissenting).
232 Brief of Appellant, NHL, at 49. Although this would be a logical and war-
ranted extension of Justice White's/ewe/ Tea approach, see note 231 supra, it would not
necessarily be accepted by the Supreme Court, since it would further limit the scope of
the antitrust laws. The NHL's argument would he rejected if the Court were to view
the requirement that the provision itself he sought by the union in its own interest as an
essential part of the White-Connell balancing mechanism. By this view, a court could
only find a sufficiently direct advancement of union interests where the restrictive
provision is sought by the union in the first instance, and not where it is included in
the agreement as a union concession.
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have had to cite Jewel Tea as support for upholding section 9A. The court's
more limited inquiry into whether only one labor policy—that of promoting
legitimate collective bargaining—was advanced, allowed it to consider the
Mackey distinction between a market restraint which affects only parties to a
collective bargaining agreement, and one which affects third parties. Like the
Eighth Circuit, the McCourt court thought that a restraint of the former type
should be ascribed far less weight in the antitrust scale than should one which
affects business competitors, as in Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell. Under
this analysis, where no third party is affected, the labor exemption may apply,
even in the absence of a finding that the restrictive provision was sought by
the union in its own interest. Provided the policy of promoting legitimate
collective bargaining is advanced, the labor side of the tionstatutory exemp-
tion scales will outweigh the antitrust side. 23 "
If the Supreme Court were to review this issue, it likely would extend the
Justice White-Connell approach and distinguish market restraints which affect
only parties to a bargaining agreement containing the restrictive provision
from those which affect third parties. The difference between the restraints
involved in the Hutcheson to Connell line of cases and those involved in most of
the sports reserve system cases 2a4 has been pointed out by at least. two com-
mentators 2"5
 and by Justice Marshall in Flood v. Kuhn:23" The Supreme
Court decisions holding that a restriction which adversely affects business
competitors can be outweighed only by the advancement of two labor policies,
do not necessarily require such a heavy labor weight to overcome a restraint
which only operates on the players. The argument that a market restraint
which is imposed only after bona fide, arm's length bargaining between all
affected parties should be weighed less heavily in the antitrust side of the
scales is compelling indeed. Labor law requires both sides to negotiate over
mandatory bargaining subjects, and a restrictive provisk ►
 included in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement in this form, theoretically, has been subject to the
input and bargaining strategies of the negotiating parties."' Third parties
have no similar opportunity to participate in the negotiations. It seems clear
that a court should be more willing to hold the agreement. up to the light of
the Sherman Act. where a non-bargaining Unit is affected than where the sig-
natories seek to invalidate an agreement over which they have bargained in
good faith. This is the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' view, and the Supreme
Court. should agree.
Thus, McCann most likely marks the end of the decade of successful
player challenges to professional sports league reserve systems on antitrust
grounds. The players' associations of football, baseball, aml basketball, like
233 Sec text. at notes 194-204 supra.
234 Philadelphia Hockey Glob, 351 F. Sum.). 462, is the exception, since it involved
an allegation by a third party. competitor league that the N141.'s reserve system viol-
ated the Sherman Act.
235
 ‘VEISTART & LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS. * 5.05; Jacobs & Winners, 81
YALE: U. at 26-28.
23" 407 U.S. at 294 {Marshall, J., dissenting); see note 198 supra.
237
 WEISTART & LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.115 at 556-68.
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that of hockey, recently have signed collective bargaining agreements accept-
ing reserve systems in various forms."' Since there no longer are any com-
petitor leagues to allege injury from the agreements, 23 " since courts view re-
serve systems as mandatory bargaining subjects, 24 " and since there is no evi-
dence that the negotiations leading to these agreements were less bona fide
than the NH L-NHLPA's, 241 the Mackey-McCourt analysis would seem effec-
tively to shield the reserve systems of all major sports leagues from antitrust.
attack.
Far more subtly, the Sixth Circuit's characterization of the new player
benefits, when viewed in light of the entire opinion, reveals the court's belief
that it is time to reexamine the relative weights of the policies that are consi-
dered on the labor side of the scale. Had the McCourt panel agreed with jus-
tice White that two labor policies should be accorded equal weight, the court.
at least would have addressed the issue whether union interests were ad-
vanced in the 1976 Agreement. Instead, it chose to ignore the argument that.
the new player benefits were important insofar as they advanced these in-
terests, while pointing to these same benefits as evidence of bona fide collec-
tive bargaining. The court's implicit challenge to Justice White's jewel Tea
analysis is buttressed by its endorsement of the Eighth Circuit's Mackey
reasoning-which primarily emphasizes the nonstatutory exemption's origins
in collective bargaining policy 212 —and by its contention that the restrictive
provision need not be bargained for by the union, provided it is bargained
over. 243 In the Sixth Circuit's view, a union's failure to advance its interests
because of the employers' hard bargaining does not mean that the labor
exemption must be disallowed. Such a failure, the court notes, is "a part of
and not apart from the collective bargaining process," the "ultimate objective"
of which is an agreement accepted by the parties. 244 Thus, examining the
tenor of' the McCourt opinion, the court's reluctance to accept the NHL's ar-
gument that the union interest, as well as the collective bargaining, policy had
been advanced, and its interpretation• of the significance of the new player
benefits, it is submitted that, at least as far as the labor exemption issue is
concerned, the Sixth-Circuit views the integrity of the collective bargaining
process as more important than the labor interests which a union may seek to
further via that process.
Such a reading of McCourt could have consequences extending far
beyond the sports reserve system cases. While not directly challenging the
Supreme Court., 245 the Sixth Circuit. has joined its brethren on the Third and
228 WEISTART & LOWELL, THE 1.AW OF SPORTS § 5.03 at 507-24; Lee, supra
note 6, at 423.
235 The last major "competitor- league, the World Hockey Association, was
merged into the NHL in May of 1979. Boston Globe. Dec. 26, 1979, at 51.
24" See note 215 supra.
241 It%,'ElSTART & DME1.1., THE LAW o• SPORTS § 5.06 at 568-90; Lee, supra note
6, at 243.
242 See text and note at note 203 supra.
2 " Sec text at note 223 SUPIII.
211 600 F.2d at 1203.
245 The decision in McCourt follows naturally from the Justice White -Connell
balancing approach if it is accepted that where no third party is adversely affected, the
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Eighth Circuits in intimating that the two labor policies in the Supreme
Court's balance no longer should be weighed equally. 24 " The question left.
open by these courts is whether the collective bargaining process policy is
weighty enough to protect market restraints which affect non-signatories
when the restrictive provision is the product of bona fide collective bargaining
on mandatory subjects, but where no union interest. is advanced. One is left
with the distinct impression that these circuit courts lean toward Justice
Goldberg's affirmative answer to this question.
If the Supreme Court were to respond to the concerns and suggestions
implicit in these circuit court opinions by reexamining the labor exemption
issue, a reasoned analysis should lead it to modify the Justice White-Connell
balancing test. As suggested by the confusing sets of three opinions of three
Justices in Pennington and Jewel Tea, and by the close 5-4 decision in Connell,
there is no clear or long-standing consensus on the nonstatutory exemption
issue at the Supreme Court. level. The result. in Jewel Tea, after all, owes as
much to Justice Goldberg's opinion as to Justice White's. It would seem, then,
that an approach more closely aligned with that of justice Goldberg is not
totally foreclosed by Court. precedent.
Implicit lower court challenges and the lack of a Supreme Court consen-
sus do not mandate a rejection of the Justice White-Connell test. The argu-
ment for modifying the test., however, becomes compelling when it is recog-
nized that the main-premise upon which it is based has been invalidated. Jus-
tice While premised his balancing of labor and antitrust laws upon his percep-
tion that congressional labor policies were at least equally concerned with be-
nefiting organized labor as with facilitating the collective bargaining process.
This was clearly Congress' intent when the Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia, and
Wagner Acts were passed. As one commentator has observed, these Acts were
designed, in full or in part, to protect "a weak and nascent labor movement
from destruction at the hands of powerful industrialists who had a de-
monstrated ability to use the courts to their advantage. "247 It is arguable,
antitrust side of the balance can he outweighed by one labor policy. See text at notes
234-37 supra.
2411 Mackey , 543 F.2d at 611, 612. As noted above, the Eighth Circuit wrote that
the "basis of the nonstatutory exemption is the national policy favoring collective bar-
gaining ...," id. at 612, and assumed that this was the only relevant labor policy to be
balanced against the antitrust laws. Id. at 613-14. Sec text and notes at notes 196 & 203
supra.
Scooper Dooper, 494 F.2d at 847 n.14. The Third Circuit wrote that it was con-
ceited with "preserving the integrity of the negotiating process," and that the "labor
exemption to the antitrust laws applies to the bargaining agreement, the product of
negotiations between unions and management." Id. See text and notes at notes 182 &
183 supra .
Accord, Ackerman-Chillingwordt v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d
484, 501 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (citing Mackey, Scooper
Dooper, and Justice Goldberg's Jewel Tea opinion, in support of its statement that the
nonstatutory exemption stems front a concern with "the congressional policy favoring
the peaceful resolution of employer-union disputes through bargaining....").
247 Siegel, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor—Magna Carta or Carte Blanche?, 13
DuQ. L. REv. 411, 466-67 (1975).
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however, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's protection of labor was meant to
apply only "under prevailing economic conditions,"'-' a8 until such time as or-
ganized labor is no longer demonstrably weaker than most employer
groups. 24" Largely because of this congressionally mandated labor protection,
the framework within which labo•-management negotiations take place is far
different today than in the 1930s. As organized labor has become more
economically, politically, and numerically powerful in recent decades, it. has
become less clear that there is an imbalance in labor-management bargaining
that needs redressing. The Supreme Court has noted that Congress reacted to
this change in prevailing conditions by passing legislation which places pri-
mary emphasis on free collective bargaining between theoretically equal bargain-
ing units. In its 1970 decision in Boy.s. Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local
770,25 ° the Court explained:
As labor organizations grew in strength and develOped toward
maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the nas-
cent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining
and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of in-
dustrial disputes. This shift in emphasis was accomplished, however,
without extensive revision of many of the older enactments ... . 251
This congressional "shift in emphasis" would seem to undermine the continu-
ing validity of justice White's premise that Congress intends to accord equal
weight to the two national labor policies considered in the justice White-
Connell test.
The Court should respond to these changes in congressional labor con-
cerns by ascribing greater weight to the national policy favoring collective
bargaining and correspondingly less weight to that of advancing the interests
of organized labor. This could result in a balancing test very similar to Justice
Goldberg's, under which collective bargaining policy would be viewed as im-
portant enough to allow the labor exemption to protect any market restraint
which results from bona fide, arm's length collective bargaining on mandatory
subjects. If the Court were to view unions and employers as bargaining
equals, neither the origin of an anticompetitive provision, nor its effect on
union interests would be relevant to the nonstatutory exemption issue. In ad-
dition, the Mackey-McCourt distinction between different types of market re-
straints would be unnecessary, since the Court would not require two labor
policies to be advanced to protect a restriction which affects business com-
petitors, but only one where no third party is affected.
V. CONCLUSION
The contours of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws
are by no means cast in stone; reconciling congressional labor and antitrust
policies is a difficult task. The justice White-Connell balancing mechanism was
248 47 Stitt 70 (1932) at § 2.
"" See Siegel, 13 Dug. L. REV at 466-72.
25" 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
25 ' Id. at 251.
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developed to steer a course between those who would place primary emphasis
on the Sherman Act and those who would focus on the labor policy favoring
collective bargaining. Vet, no clear or long-standing consensus exists, either at
the Supreme Court or among the lower courts, as to how the labor and anti-
trust scales should be weighted. In distinguishing between restrictive provi-
sions which affect. only parties to a collective bargaining agreement. and those
which affect third parties, McCourt properly has recognized that sonic market
restraints are More abhorrent. to the Sherman Act than arc others. The Su-
preme Court would likely agree that this analysis accords with its balancing
approach, and it, seems that the era of successful player antitrust challenges to
professional sports league reserve systems has ended with McCourt.
More importantly, McCourt forces reflection upon the labor side of the
balance. The Sixth Circuit's primary concern for collective bargaining policy is
not a novel approach; three Supreme Court justices advanced a similar
analysis in the first case applying the nonstatutory exemption. McCourt follows
increasing recognition by commentators, lower courts, and the Supreme Court
itself of a pronounced shift in congressional emphasis from protecting weak
unions to promoting the collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court
should readdress the nonstatutory labor exemption issue and decide whether
this shift in emphasis warrants a modification of its balancing test. It would
not be surprising if the Court were to adopt an approach under which only
the national collective bargaining policy is weighed against the antitrust laws.
A "labor" exemption which is in no way based upon the advancement of
union interests policy would bear little resemblance to that first recognized by
the Court in 1941. It would be, however, a logical outgrowth of the changes
in the labor-management bargaining framework that have occurred since the
passage of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
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